WHIP SCARS ON THE NAKED SOUL: MYTH AND ELENCHOS IN PLATO'S GORGIAS

Radcli fe G. Edmonds III
Stripped of his regal robes and all the trappings of his worldly power, the soul of the Great King cowers naked before Rhadamanthys, who looks down upon the crippled wretch before him, dis gured like the basest slave by the marks of the whip and covered with festering sores. Many scholars have interpreted this horri c image of the judgement of the soul from Plato's Gorgias as a threat of hell-re designed to convince the skeptical Callicles that justice pays 'in the end'. The myth at the end of the Gorgias has thus been seen as a failure of Plato's philosophy, one of those places which, in Zeller's condescending words, 'indicate the point at which it becomes evident that as yet [Plato] cannot be wholly a philosopher, because he is too much a poet'. Scholars have been critical of what they see as an attempt by Plato to beg the premises of his argument for the philosophic life by appealing to the idea that justice always pays o f 'in the end' because of some system of compensation in the hereafter. Even Annas, whose treatment of Plato's myths of judgement is among the most sensitive, sees the myth in the Gorgias as asserting a necessary premise without proof: 'The Gorgias myth is both the most religiously coloured and the starkest in the claim it makes that justice pays in the end …. In the Gorgias, Plato insists atly that justice will bring rewards in the end, though without giving us any good reason to believe this'. Without the moral optimism that Zeller (1888) , 163 . This idea that the myths betray the limits of Plato's philosophic ability goes back to Hegel. Annas (1982) , 125, 138, here 125: 'The myth, then, is giving a consequentialist reason to be just. Whether we take it as really threatening future punishment for wrongdoing, or demythologize its message as the claim that being wicked brings the punishment of a scarred and deformed soul now, its message is still that justice pays 'in the end,' on a deeper level than we can now see'. I would point out, however, the crucial di ference between 'in the end' and 'on a deeper level' of reality. justice will prevail in the end, she asks, how could one not be as unconvinced as Callicles by these old wives' tales?
I argue, to the contrary, that the details of the myth help clarify the ways in which Plato tries to prove that Socrates' way of life really is better than Callicles', not just 'in the end,' after the afterlife judgement, but right now, at any given moment. Speci cally, I suggest that a proper understanding of the myth helps resolve another of the recurring problems in Platonic scholarship, the nature of the Socratic elenchos. Plato carefully manipulates the traditional mythic details in his tale of an afterlife judgement to provide an illustration, in vivid and graphic terms, of the workings of the Socratic elenchos. Not only does myth of the reform of the afterlife judgement illustrate through narrative the contrasts between Socrates' elenchos and the rhetorical arguments of his interlocutors, but the description of the judgement and punishment as the examination and healing of a soul scarred with wounds and disease illuminates the e fects of the elenchos on the interlocutors. The image of the Great King's scarred and misshapen soul, stripped of all its coverings and supports and examined by the expert in justice, illustrates the way Socrates puts his interlocutors to the test, while the afterlife punishments prescribed for the wrong-doers depict the su fering that the shame of the elenchos in icts. Moreover, Plato manipulates the traditional mythic punishment of the water carriers to depict the life of those who fail to be cured by the therapeutic punishment of the elenchos. The myth does not supplement a de cient argument for the philosophic life; rather, Plato makes use of the narrative and the traditional aspects of the myth to depict the examination of the unexamined life in the here and now.
T E
The 'Socratic elenchos' is a term used in the scholarship for the method of argumentation that Socrates employs in all of the so-called 'early' dialogues, a process of question and answer by which Socrates shows his interlocutor that his statements involve an inconsistency. While in other Cf. Saunders (1991) , 205, 'Socrates' interlocutors, who are commonly sceptical of the need to cultivate the soul and to adhere to just conduct at any price, are confronted with edifying and powerful stories designed to appeal to their feelings and imagination, even if argument has failed to convince their intellect '. Vlastos (1983) , 39, translates the procedure into the propositional logic of modern philosophers, although Brickhouse and Smith (1991) , 135 f., have emphasized that Socrates dialogues Socrates employs his elenchos without much comment on its form or method, in the Gorgias the elenchos is not only employed, but discussed by the interlocutors. The verb Socrates uses to describe this process of refutation or cross-examination is elenchein, which derives from the Homeric to elenchos, meaning shame or disgrace. The implicit competition in this form of argument has been stressed in recent scholarship; the elenchos is a contest of speech between two parties-to win is to put your opponent to shame (elenchein), to lose is to be humiliated (elenchesthai). Like any of the contests which were central to the Greek way of life, however, the elenchos must be played by the rules, and, in the Gorgias, Socrates carefully speci es the rules for his kind of elenchos, rules that di fer in signicant ways from the refutations practiced in the law courts and the assemblies. The basic process of refutation, pointing out a contradiction between accepted premises and consequences that follow from them, is not much is testing not so much propositions as ways of life, cf. La. 187e6-188a2; Ap. 39c7. See also the critique of Vlastos' elenchos in Talisse (2002) . Whether the so-called 'early' dialogues (Vlastos' list is Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthydemus, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Major and Minor, Ion, Laches, Lysis, Menexenus, Protagoras , and the rst book of the Republic) were in fact written earlier than Plato's other dialogues is irrelevant for my purposes. They may be conveniently grouped together because they exhibit a number of common characteristics, one of which is the prominent use of the elenchos. Brickhouse and Smith (1991) , in their examination of Socrates' use of the elenchos, draw together from other dialogues many of Socrates' comments on the way the elenchos should be conducted, but the Gorgias is the only dialogue in which Socrates explicitly compares types of refutations.
The Attic ὁ ἔλεγχος is generally used in the speci c sense of a legal or rhetorical refutation, in contrast to the broader epic sense of shame, but the sense of failing a test or contest always underlies this refutation. To lose a contest or to fail a test, particularly in a public arena such as a lawcourt or even a street corner in front of a crowd, inevitably produces shame for the loser. While in other dialogues, the elenchos can become a friendly game played between friends, where the element of shame is minimized, in the Gorgias, the game is less friendly and the shame element is more prominent.
See especially Lesher (2002) , who traces the use of the word from its Homeric uses to its philosophic uses in Parmenides and up to Plato, Ausland (2002) , who emphasizes the forensic context for the elenchos, and Dorion (1990) , who emphasizes the agonistic nature of the elenchos and shows the ways in which Plato builds upon contemporary forensic procedure to create his own type of philosophic elenchos. Cf. Tarrant (2002) , 68: 'The Greek verb was still correctly understood as involving the exposure of an opponent. In forensic speeches, where it was extremely common, it might involve the exposure of the faults (and hence the guilt) of the defendant, or the accuracy (and hence the reliability) of a witness. It was never a friendly process'. See ibid., n. 3: 'I count 181 uses of elenchos terminology in the speeches attributed to Antiphon, Andocides, Lysias, Isaeus, and Isocrates'. Adkins (1960), 30-60 rightly points to the connections between shame and failure to succeed at heroic action.
. di ferent when employed by Socrates from the process employed by eristic opponents like Dionysiodorus or indeed by opponents in the law courts. Plato nevertheless has Socrates insist on di ferences in his mode of elenchos, and he further ampli es and illustrates those di ferences with the myth at the end of the dialogue.
J R
In the Gorgias, Plato plays o f his contemporaries' understanding of the way a normal Athenian legal contest worked to level a critique at the judicial system that condemned his teacher to death, contrasting the contest of litigation with his ideal of philosophic examination. Success in the Athenian lawcourts, it must be remembered, did not depend on ngerprints, bloodstains, and DNA evidence. Rather, the trial was a contest between two opponents, both of whom were subject to the scrutiny and judgement of the huge panel of dikasts. In the absence of high standards for material evidence, the dikasts' decision had to be made largely on the grounds of the character of the accuser and accused. A fragment of Euripides' Phoenix expresses the idea nicely: 'I've already been chosen to judge many disputes and have heard witnesses competing against each other with opposing accounts of the same event. And like any wise man I work out the truth by looking at a man's nature and the life he leads'. Accordingly, both sides tried to present themselves in the most positive light, appealing to the standards and prejudices of the dikasts. Much of the preparation for an e fective law court speech consisted in the creation of a portrait of the speaker that would appeal to the dikasts. In the courts, the witnesses served to establish the litigant's status in Athenian society and to a rm his good reputation within the networks As Tulin (2005), 304 comments, 'admittedly, Plato never tired of distinguishing his dialectic from the petty, logic-chopping sophistic which he terms eristic, antilogic, and the like: his seeks truth, theirs seeks only victory, doxa, and appearance. But, this said, the fact remains that there is no formal di ference between the two, and that Plato retains (from rst to last) a lively interest in the gymnastic, or purely logical aspect of the elenchus-developing by example many of the ner points of logic which Aristotle would later formalize as precept '. Cf. Ausland (2002) , who compares the usage of the elenchos in forensic contexts and Platonic dialogues. Dorion (1990) argues that Plato draws on the ἐρώτησις procedure of the law courts in manipulating the elenchos.
ἤδη δὲ πο ῶν λόγων κριτὴς καὶ πό ' ἁµι ηθέντα µαρτύρων ὕπο τἀναντί' ἔγνων συµφορᾶς µιᾶς πέρι. κἀγὼ µὲν οὕτω χὥστις ἔστ' ἀνὴρ σοφὸς λογίζοµαι τἀληθές, εἰς ἀνδρὸς φύσιν σκοπῶν δίαιτάν θ' ἥντιν' ἡµερευται (fr. 812 Nauck-from Aeschines, C. Timarch. 152). See Humphreys (1985) , 313-369, esp. 322 f. of family and local units of which he was a part, thus supplementing the positive self-presentation in his speeches.
In the myth, this normal Athenian system of justice is in place before the reign of Zeus over the cosmos: the one about to die appears before a large mass of dikasts to defend the conduct of his life, and he sways his judges with his displays of character and status, bolstered not only by his trappings of wealth and power but by the witness of his friends.
For now the cases are judged badly. For those being judged (he said) are judged with clothes on; for they are judged while they're still alive. And so many (he said) with base souls are covered in ne bodies and noble birth and riches; and when their judgement comes, many witnesses come to support them and to testify that they have lived justly. And so the judges are impressed by all this; and at the same time they judge with clothes on, obstructed by eyes and ears and their whole body in front of their soul. All these things, then, are in their way, both their own coverings and the defendants.
(Gorg. 523c2-d5)
To remedy the injustices this system produced, however, Zeus reforms the whole system of judgement. Not only will mortals be judged after death by other dead people, but they will be stripped of the foreknowledge of death, leaving them no time to prepare an elaborate defence. Moreover, they will be stripped at death not only of their bodies, but also of all their marks of status in life, all of the clothes and riches and supporting witnesses. The naked soul alone will face judgement, and not by a mass of ignorant citizens, but by a single expert judge: one of the sons of Zeus famed for his wisdomRhadamanthys, Aiakos, or Minos (Gorg. 523a1-524b1).
As scholars such as Todd and Humphreys stress, the primary function of a witness in the Athenian court was not, as in the modern courtroom, to present impartial factual evidence, but rather to support the status of the speaker. Witnesses represented, in Humphreys' terms, 'the social networks in which litigants were personally known. The support and good opinion of such social networks was very important for the litigant' (Humphreys [1985], 350) . See Todd (1990) , 23: 'Traditional interpretation of the Athenian law of evidence rests on the unstated assumption that Athenian witness had the same primary function as a modern witness: to tell the truth. But it is clear even on a cursory examination that Athenians did not use witnesses in the way that we do'. νῦν µὲν γὰρ κακῶς αἱ δίκαι δικάζονται. ἀµπεχόµενοι γάρ, ἔφη, οἱ κρινόµενοι κρίνονται· ζῶντες γὰρ κρίνονται. πο οὶ οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχοντες ἠµφιεσµένοι εἰσὶ σώµατά τε καλὰ καὶ γένη καὶ πλούτους, καί, ἐπειδὰν ἡ κρίσις ᾖ, ἔρχονται αὐτοῖς πο οὶ µάρτυρες, µαρτυρήσοντες ὡς δικαίως βεβιώκασιν· οἱ οὖν δικασταὶ ὑπό τε τούτων ἐκπλήττονται, καὶ ἅµα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀµπεχόµενοι δικάζουσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς αὑτῶν ὀφθαλµοὺς καὶ ὦτα καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶµα προκεκαλυµµένοι. ταῦτα δὴ αὐτοῖς πάντα ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται, καὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ἀµφιέσµατα καὶ τὰ τῶν κρινοµένων.
Citations from the Gorgias are from the text of Dodds (1959) ; I take all the translations of the Gorgias from Irwin (1979) . . The reforms of the judicial process that Zeus imposes in the myth correspond to the di ferences that Socrates points out between his elenchos and the lawcourt rhetoric of his interlocutors, particularly that of the impetuous Polus. Just as souls under the new regime cannot prepare an elaborate defence speech, so Socrates repeatedly prohibits his interlocutors from making the long, oratorical speeches that would be appropriate in a lawcourt, requiring them to submit to the examination of the elenchos (Gorg. 449b48).
Calling witnesses as if in an Athenian court is another mark of the rhetorical style of Polus' refutation which Socrates rejects. When Socrates refuses to agree with him, Polus appeals to the crowd to support him. 'Don't you think you are thoroughly refuted, Socrates, when you say things like this, that not a single man would say? For look, ask one of these people here' (Gorg. 473e4-5). Socrates accuses Polus: 'You're trying to refute me rhetorically, like those who think they're refuting people in the jury-courts' (471e2-3).
Socrates, by contrast, claims that his elenchos produces the one crucial witness worth more than any number of other witnesses, the interlocutor himself. 'For I know how to produce just one witness to whatever I saythe man I am having a discussion with whoever he may be-but I forget about the many. I know how to put the question to a vote to one man, ῏Αρ' οὖν ἐθελήσαις ἄν, ὦ Γοργία, ὥσπερ νῦν διαλεγόµεθα, διατελέσαι τὸ µὲν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δ' ἀποκρινόµενος, τὸ δὲ µῆκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο, οἷον καὶ Πῶλος ἤρξατο, εἰς αὖθις ἀποθέσθαι; ἀ ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνῇ, µὴ ψεύσῃ, ἀ ὰ ἐθέλησον κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρωτώµενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι. 'Then would you be willing, Gorgias, to continue this present way of discussion, by alternate question and answer, and defer to some other time that lengthy style of speech in which Polus made a beginning? Come, be true to your promise, and consent to answer each question brie y'. See also 462a1-4: ἀ ' εἴ τι κήδῃ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ εἰρηµένου καὶ ἐπανορθώσασθαι αὐτὸν βούλει, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ἀνθέµενος ὅτι σοι δοκεῖ, ἐν τῷ µέρει ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἐρωτώµενος, ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ Γοργίας, ἔλεγχέ τε καὶ ἐλέγχου. 'No, if you have any concern for the argument that we have carried on, and care to set it on its feet again, revoke whatever you please, as I suggested just now; take your turn in questioning and being questioned, like me and Gorgias; and thus either refute or be refuted'.
Οὐκ οἴει ἐξεληλέγχθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν τοιαῦτα λέγῃς ἃ οὐδεὶς ἂν φήσειεν ἀνθρώπων; ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ τινα τουτωνί. Socrates characterizes this law court refutation as 'worth nothing towards the truth. For sometimes someone may actually be beaten by many false witnesses thought to amount to something'. 471e7-472a2: οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἔλεγχος οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστιν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν· ἐνίοτε γὰρ ἂν καὶ καταψευδοµαρτυρηθείη τις ὑπὸ πο ῶν καὶ δοκούντων εἶναί τι (Plato, unlike the Lord Chancellor in Iolanthe, tends to 'assume that the witnesses summoned in force,| in Exchequer, Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Divorce,| have perjured themselves as a matter of course …').
ῥητορικῶς γάρ µε ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡγούµενοι ἐλέγχειν. See Dorion (1990), 323-327, on the use of witnesses in the courts and Plato's critique. but don't even have a dialogue with the many' (474a5-b1). Socrates rejects the 'wisdom of the masses,' preferring to settle the question with a dialogic interchange between two individuals.
Plato crafts his description of the reformed afterlife judgement to resemble the Socratic elenchos, tailoring the traditional mythic motifs to t with the process. Like the Socratic elenchos, the afterlife judgement in Zeus' regime takes place between two individuals, an examiner and an examined. In both, the examined is the only admissible witness, and that one witness is su cient for a judgement, even superior to a crowd of false witnessesthe body, the clothes, the friends and relatives of the deceased-who could obstruct the examiner in his inquiry. The striking image of the naked soul, unprepared and trembling before the expert judge, depicts the interlocutor whose beliefs are being examined in the elenchos, bereft of appeals to popular opinion or the authority of his social status, and the chronological structure of the narrative in the myth highlights the logical contrast between types of refutations.
M M
Rather than the afterlife judge acting as a surrogate punisher for the wrongs committed against others, as the limited evidence for earlier myths of the afterlife suggests, in the Gorgias myth, the judge uses his expertise to ἐγὼ γὰρ ὧν ἂν λέγω ἕνα µὲν παρασχέσθαι µάρτυρα ἐπίσταµαι, αὐτὸν πρὸς ὃν ἄν µοι ὁ λόγος ᾖ, τοὺς δὲ πο οὺς ἐῶ χαίρειν, καὶ ἕνα ἐπιψηφίζειν ἐπίσταµαι, τοῖς δὲ πο οῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγοµαι. After Socrates has made Polus concede that neither he nor anyone else could prefer to do injustice rather than su fer it, he once again draws the contrast between their two styles of elenchos. 'You see, then, Polus, that when this refutation is compared with that one it is not at all like it. You have everyone else agreeing with you except me, but I am quite satis ed with you just by yourself, agreeing and being my witness. I put the question for a vote to you alone, and let all the others go'. 475e7-476a2: ῾Ορᾷς οὖν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἔλεγχος παρὰ τὸν ἔλεγχον παραβα όµενος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν, ἀ ὰ σοὶ µὲν οἱ ἄ οι πάντες ὁµολογοῦσιν πλὴν ἐµοῦ, ἐµοὶ δὲ σὺ ἐξαρκεῖς εἷς ὢν µόνος καὶ ὁµολογῶν καὶ µαρτυρῶν, καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ µόνον ἐπιψηφίζων τοὺς ἄ ους ἐῶ χαίρειν.
Cf. Socrates' rejections of the common opinion in Laches, 184e and Crito, 46d-47d (a contrast to Xenophon's depiction of Socratic argument starting from common opinion in Memorabilia, 4.6.15). Moreover, if indeed Socrates' mention of his service on the Council is meant to recall the illegal trial of the Generals after Arginusae, Plato is attacking not just the idea of having a mass of dikasts, but also the idea of trying a group of defendants en masse. Another layer of imagery that may be in play is the idea of the private arbitration that could often substitute for the public trial, in which a single arbitrator (chosen by both parties out of respect for his fairness and insight) would render a judgement instead of the mass of dikasts.
The examiner too relies not on the bodily senses that perceive these super cial attributes, but on the faculties of his soul.
. evaluate the soul by the wrongs it has done to itself, the harm caused to the soul by its way of life, and then, like a doctor, to prescribe the appropriate corrective treatment.
Diagnosis
In the myth, the deceased mortal, stripped of body and marks of mortal status, faces the judge with a naked soul. Just as presenting a good appearance through one's rhetoric and witnesses is the key to winning in an Athenian court, so too in the afterlife the primary criterion on which Aiakos or Rhadamanthys evaluates the deceased is the appearance of his soul.
But what, for Plato, is a good-looking soul? Plato employs very physical terms to describe the soul in this dialogue, and a good-looking soul is described in terms appropriate to a good-looking body. A soul must present an appearance worthy of a free citizen, well developed from exercise in the gymnasium and without the whip scars that mark the disobedient slave or the festering sores that indicate poor health. The soul coming to judgement bears only the marks of the conditioning of its soul, which are exposed to the expert knowledge of the judge who can diagnose the disease or deformity of the soul from its appearance and prescribe the tting correction. The expert examination of the judge in the myth thus serves As so often, especially in an aristocratic context, the aesthetic appearance carries a moral connotation-καλός is both beautiful and good, while αἰσχρός is ugly, base, and shameful. Only an appearance that is ne enough quali es for honoured treatment. However, the afterlife judgement of naked souls may well also recall the examination of the athletes before a competition such as the Olympic games, in which the competitors had to strip down and be examined by judges who, on the basis of the athletes' physical development, would classify them as paides or ephebes, cf. Pausanias V, 24.10 (I owe this idea to Betsy Gebhard). Unfortunately no evidence remains that gives any detailed description of such a process of judgement before the competition. It may well be that the Gorgias contains more imagery resonant of this process, but the allusions are lost to the modern reader.
Cf. 524c5-d7, where the marks on the soul are compared to marks on the body. The souls of the dead were frequently imagined as eidola of the deceased-insubstantial, but essentially like the deceased as he was remembered from life. The deceased was frequently represented as being like to the living person, but with the wounds that caused his death. Such an image appears not only in Homer (Odyssey, 9, (40) (41) , where Odysseus sees 'many ghting men killed in battle, stabbed with brazen spears, still carrying their bloody armour on them,' but on numerous vases, where the depiction of dead men with bandaged wounds was a recognized topos. Dodds ad loc (p. 379) points out the tradition of scarred souls following Plato: Lucian, Cataplus, 24 f.; Philo, Spec. Leg. i. 103; Plutarch, Ser. num. vind. 22, 564d ; Epictetus 2.18.11; Tacitus, Annals 6.6.; Themistius, Orat. 20, 234a. The wounds that the body sustained were, moreover, thought to leave their mark on the soul after death, to the extent that those who feared the retribution of the angry dead might deliberately mutilate the the same function as the examination in the elenchos, to determine the errors in the patient's way of life. By using Socrates' myth, Plato presents in graphic form the contradictions exposed by the Socratic elenchos as the scars and wounds that mar the soul which is laid bare to Aiakos or Rhadamanthys.
Prescriptions for Corrective Treatment
While Plato uses the tale of Zeus' reform and the image of the naked soul to illustrate the contrasts between the rhetoric of the Athenian lawcourts and the Socratic elenchos, other aspects of the myth depict the e fects of the elenchos itself. The metaphor of the diagnosis and healing of the soul underlies both the discussions of the elenchos in the dialogue and the myth at the end, providing a link between the two. The e fect of the elenchos is described in medical terms throughout the dialogue, and the myth separates the diagnostic and curative functions of the process in its images of judgement and punishment.
Scholars of ancient philosophy have debated what the Socratic elenchos is supposed to achieve in the philosophic arguments of the Platonic dialogues. Many suppose that the elenchos is purely negative, disproving the false ideas of Socrates' interlocutors, whereas Vlastos and others have argued that Plato intended the elenchos to do more, to prove the truth of the corpse to prevent it from being able to wreak its revenge. The ritual of machalismos, which Clytemnestra is said by both Aeschylus and Sophocles to have performed on Agamemnon, involves chopping o f the hands of the dead man and stringing them under his armpits, e fectively disarming any attempt he might make at revenge from beyond the grave, cf. Aeschylus, Choephoroi, 439, Sophocles, Electra, 445. According to the scholiast on Sophocles' Electra, this gruesome operation was performed to deprive the deceased of the power of avenging the murder: ἵνα, φασιν, ἀσθενὴς γένοιτο πρὸς ἀντιτίασθαι τὸν φονέα.
Nothing in the soul was healthy, but it was thoroughly whip-marked and full of scars from false oaths and injustice-all that each of his actions stained into the soul-and everything was crooked from lying and insolence, and nothing straight, from being brought up without truth; and he saw that from liberty and luxury and excess and incontinence in actions the soul was full of disproportion and shamefulness. 524e4-525a6: οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὂν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀ ὰ διαµεµαστιγωµένην καὶ οὐλῶν µεστὴν ὑπὸ ἐπιορκιῶν καὶ ἀδικίας, ἃ ἑκάστη ἡ πρᾶξις αὐτοῦ ἐξωµόρξατο εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλαζονείας καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθὺ διὰ τὸ ἄνευ ἀληθείας τεθράφθαι· καὶ ὑπὸ ἐξουσίας καὶ τρυφῆς καὶ ὕβρεως καὶ ἀκρατίας τῶν πράξεων ἀσυµµετρίας τε καὶ αἰσχρότητος γέµουσαν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶδεν.
For further views on the elenchos, see Vlastos (1983); Kraut (1983); Irwin (1979); Brickhouse and Smith (1984 , 1991 , and 1997 Kahn (1984 and 1996); May (1997), and Talisse (2002) . Scott (2002) contains a number of essays that treat the elenchos from a variety of perspectives, mostly using Vlastos (1983) as a starting point.
. opposing positions and thus to teach the interlocutors something. I would argue that the medical metaphor is crucial to understanding the e fect of the elenchos in the Platonic dialogues. Is the elenchos merely diagnostic, pointing out the interlocutors' errors or does it also serve a curative function, correcting the errors that it has diagnosed? Plato supplements his discussion of the workings of the elenchos in the dialogue with the description of the afterlife judgement in the myth, and this description of the process of judgement and punishment of the soul in the afterlife provides a clearer picture of the e fects and limits of the Socratic elenchos.
In developing the medical metaphor of the health of the soul, Plato again makes use of a contrast between the Socratic elenchos and forensic rhetoric. The philosophic elenchos, in contrast to the oratory of the rhetoricians like Polus and Gorgias, is described throughout the dialogue as a kind of purgative medicine designed to aid the soul in achieving a good condition. Rhetoric is compared to an elaborate banquet, designed to give pleasure to the audience. Both rhetoric and cookery are part of that practice of pandering to the pleasures of the audience without regard to its welfare that Socrates terms ' attery', kolakeia. The elenchos, by contrast, is not merely a diet, a regimen, but actually bitter medicine, painful and unpleasant to swallow, unlike the pleasing periods of oratory. Although pain is not the essential feature of medical treatment, it is an unavoidable result of the change in state that the treatment e fects-a correction or restraint of the disordered elements, kolasis. If, according to contemporary Greek theories of medicine, health is a proper balance of elements, and disease is an improper balance, then any medical treatment must alter the balance of elements in the body, a process which Plato sees as involving a certain amount of pain merely through the change. Nevertheless, those who do While some scholars, e.g., Vlastos (1983) and Irwin (1979) , argue that elenchos is intended to produce a positive result by proving the truth of some proposition, others, e.g. Benson (1987) , claim that the elenchos is intended only to disprove propositions by showing inconsistency in the interlocutor's beliefs. Brickhouse and Smith (1991) , 135 f., point out the the target of the elenchos is more the way of life that follows on the proposition in question, cf. La. 187e6-188a2; Ap. 39c7. Talisse (2002) argues as well against the idea that the proposition is the target of the elenchos, although he sees the interlocutor's knowledge, rather than way of life, as the target of the attack.
Socrates and Chaerophon, arriving too late for Gorgias' oration, are told that they have missed a feast (447a). In the elenchos, one must proceed in a moderate fashion, not snatching and grabbing at clever phrases or unfortunate de nitions as though trying to stu f oneself with the dainties prepared by the chefs (454c).
Of course, in Plato's time almost any medical procedure would have been painful and unpleasant, more in the manner of dentistry today, which remains uncomfortable despite not understand the bene ts try to avoid the painful corrections (kolaseis) of the doctor's medicine, preferring the pleasant confections (kolakeia) of the cook.
Avoiding Treatment
Plato also applies this medical metaphor in Socrates' debate with Polus whether it is better to be punished for injustice or to escape punishment. Like the child who would avoid the doctor for fear of the painful treatment, the foolish prefer to escape punishment for injustice. As Socrates remarks: 'For these people have managed to do about the same thing, my friend, as if someone su fering from the most serious illnesses, managed not to pay justice for the faults in his body to the doctors and not to be treated-afraid like a child of the burning and cutting because it is painful' (479a5-b1). Polus' hero, the tyrant who can avoid paying for any of his crimes, is reduced to the little child whimpering with fear at the prospect of a visit to the doctor that would cure his sickness.
In just this way, Socrates' interlocutors try to avoid the bitter medicine of the elenchos. Socrates rebukes both Polus and Callicles for trying to wriggle out of answering the questions that have trapped them into contradicting themselves, urging them to take their medicine: 'Don't shrink from answering, Polus-you won't be harmed at all; but present yourself nobly to the argument as to a doctor; answer (475d5-7)'. Answering in the elenchos is all the advances in anesthetics and modern technology. In the Laws, Plato explicitly talks about the pain involved in any kind of shift of mode of life or regimen. 'Take as an example the way the body gets used to all sorts of food and drink and exercise. At rst they upset it, but then in the course of time it is this very regimen that is responsible for putting on esh …. But imagine someone forced to change again, to one of the other recommended systems: initially, he's troubled by illnesses, and only slowly, by getting used to his new way of life, does he get back to normal' (La. 797d f., Saunder's translation). Saunders (1991), 172 f., sees this idea that pain is a necessary component of any change as a new element in the penal theory of the Laws, stemming from the physiology of the Timaeus, rather than an idea implicit in contemporary medical ideas that Plato applies to the reform of the soul from injustice as early as the Gorgias.
Cf. again the image of the doctor prosecuted by a cook in front of a jury of children (521e, 464de).
Σχεδὸν γάρ που οὗτοι, ὦ ἄριστε, τὸ αὐτὸ διαπεπραγµένοι εἰσὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοῖς µεγίστοις νοσήµασιν συνισχόµενος διαπράξαιτο µὴ διδόναι δίκην τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶµα ἁµαρτηµάτων τοῖς ἰατροῖς µηδὲ ἰατρεύεσθαι, φοβούµενος ὡσπερανεὶ παῖς τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ τέµνεσθαι, ὅτι ἀλγεινόν. µὴ ὄκνει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβήσῃ· ἀ ὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ παρέχων ἀποκρίνου.
. also likened to facing the doctor's treatment in the argument with Callicles. The e fect of the elenchos is to restrain or temper the one who undergoes it, to correct the imbalance in his soul and restore it to proper balance and harmony. Callicles, when he sees that he is about to be put to the shame of having to deny his thesis, tries to avoid completing the elenchos.
Socrates rebukes him: 'This man won't abide being helped and corrected (kolazomenos), and himself undergoing the very thing our discussion is about-being corrected' (505c3-4). The treatment of the elenchos cannot be e fective if the patient is able to avoid taking his medicine. Callicles indeed grumbles that he has only gone along with this argument so far at the request of Gorgias, who intervened earlier to make Callicles continue the discussion (497b5). Gorgias' role in making the patient take his philosophic medicine recalls his boast at the beginning of the dialogue that he often was able to persuade patients to take the medicines his brother the doctor was not able to get them to take (456b). As Socrates warns Callicles, if Callicles cannot refute the idea that it is better to su fer than to do injustice but continues to live by that idea, then: 'Callicles himself will not agree with you, Callicles, but he will be discordant with you in the whole of your life' (482b5-6). The elenchos, then, is depicted throughout the dialogue as a kind of purgative medicine that produces a painful e fect of kolasis upon the patient, providing a shock to his system that checks the elements of his soul that are out of balance, restores the harmony, and makes health possible.
Οὗτος ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὑποµένει ὠφελούµενος καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο πάσχων περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστί, κολαζόµενος.
οὔ σοι ὁµολογήσει Κα ικλῆς, ὦ Κα ίκλεις, ἀ ὰ διαφωνήσει ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ. Callicles is trapped between his idea that it is better not to su fer anything, even helpful restraint, and his desire to achieve the best. At the heart of Socrates' debate with Callicles is the question of whether it is better to rule or be ruled, to do or to su fer. Callicles' advocacy of extreme hedonism in the debate, as well as his political ambitions, stem from the assumption that, in every case, it is better to do actively than to su fer passively. Socrates' example of the kinaidos (494e), is fatal to Callicles' position, not because it is so disgusting that it makes even Callicles ashamed, but rather because the kinaidos presents the paradoxical case of one who actively desires to be passive. Callicles cannot handle such a contradiction of his ideal and tries to avoid the issue by claiming that such an example is too shameful for mention. On the kinaidos, see Winkler (1990) .
Cf. the description in Sophist, 230cd. For just as physicians who care for the body believe that the body cannot get bene t from any food o fered to it until all obstructions are removed, so, my boy, those who purge the soul believe that the soul can receive no bene t from any teachings o fered to it until someone by cross-questioning reduces him who is cross-questioned to an attitude of modesty, by removing the opinions that obstruct the teachings, and thus purges him and makes him think that he knows only what he knows, and no more: νοµίζοντες γάρ, ὦ παῖ φίλε, οἱ καθαίροντες αὐτούς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὰ σώµατα The myth separates, in the chronological order of the narrative, the diagnostic and punitive e fects of the elenchos. While the exposure of contradictions corresponds to the examination by the judge in the hereafter, the pain and shame (to elenchos) the interlocutor feels as he loses the argument and his way of life is turned on its head correspond to the punishments (kolaseis) the judged soul undergoes. In the Gorgias, Plato does not go into a detailed description of the process of punishment in the underworld for the one whom the judge condemns (as he does, for example, in the Phaedo); he merely describes it as undergoing 'what it is tting for it to undergo' (525a7). This punishment, however, this su fering, produces bene t for the punished soul, since it is corrected and made better by the treatment prescribed by the judge. 'Those who are bene ted and pay justice at the hands of gods and men are those who are at fault with curable faults; but still their benet comes to them through pain and su ferings both here and in Hades-for there is no other way to get rid of injustice' (525b6-c1). Plato makes the punishment of the wrongdoer in the afterlife judgement correspond to the shaming e fect of the elenchos in this life on someone who is defeated in an argument. Like taking the doctor's medicine, these processes consist of suffering something unpleasant but bene cial. However, their helpful function does have its limits; only those who submit to treatment can be cured, and those who, like Callicles, avoid the treatment cannot get the bene ts. Such ἰατροὶ νενοµίκασι µὴ πρότερον ἂν τῆς προσφεροµένης τροφῆς ἀπολαύειν δύνασθαι σῶµα, πρὶν ἂν τὰ ἐµποδίζοντα ἐντός τις ἐκβάλῃ, ταὐτὸν καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς διενοήθησαν ἐκεῖνοι, µὴ πρότερον αὐτὴν ἕξειν τῶν προσφεροµένων µαθηµάτων [230δ] ὄνησιν, πρὶν ἂν ἐλέγχων τις τὸν ἐλεγχόµενον εἰς αἰσχύνην καταστήσας, τὰς τοῖς µαθήµασιν ἐµποδίους δόξας ἐξελών, καθαρὸν ἀποφήνῃ καὶ ταῦτα ἡγούµενον ἅπερ οἶδεν εἰδέναι µόνα, πλείω δὲ µή. As Renaud (2002), 194-195, comments: 'according to this description of the elenchus, then, the soul cannot receive any bene t from knowledge if it is not rst refuted and humbled, indeed brought to shame. … If philosophy begins in wonder, the elenchus provides the wonder through the aporia, the su cient proof of one's ignorance and of the necessity of learning'.
As Callicles protests: 'If you are in earnest and these things you're saying are really true, won't this human life of ours be turned upside down, and won't everything we do evidently be the opposite of what we should do?' (481c). For discussions of the role of shame in the dialogue, contrast the arguments of Kahn (1984) with those of McKim (1988) , but it is important to remember that, whatever else Socrates' interlocutors may or may not feel shame about, they all feel shame at losing a contest-in contrast to Socrates, who proclaims that he would rather lose and be corrected than win and be wrong.
ὅµως δὲ δι' ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ὀδυνῶν γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ἡ ὠφελία καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν ῞Αιδου· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄ ως ἀδικίας ἀπα άττεσθαι.
Allen (2000), 60-61, points out the equivalence, between loss in a contest and punishment, 'punishment, like reward, was the outcome of a contest for honour, but a punishment was equivalent to a loss in a contest and a loss of honour'. This equivalence would be particularly felt by an aristocrat such as Callicles, whose life is focused on winning honour.
. unpleasant but bene cial medicine, whether it be the elenchos administered by Socrates in the streets of Athens or a judgement rendered by Aiakos in the underworld, is the only way to cure the erring soul. Those who refuse the treatment must live out their existence forever unhealed, for there is no other remedy.
T I
The Gorgias, however, is notable as a dialogue in which Socrates utterly fails to convince his interlocutors, to the extent that he must even nish his elenchos of Callicles by speaking both parts, since Callicles refuses to continue the contest. In the Gorgias, Socrates and Callicles both regard each other as pathological cases, in need of radical treatment to correct the unhealthy way in which they spend their lives. While Callicles warns Socrates to give up his practice of skulking in the corners, playing at philosophy with a few young boys, and to take up the place of a man, using rhetoric to win contests in the assembly and the lawcourts, Socrates earnestly tries to convince Callicles to submit his life to philosophic scrutiny and to give up the life of the mob orator. Callicles' refusal to take his medicine, however, marks him as one of the incurables Socrates describes in the myth, who cannot bene t from the treatment they get in the afterlife judgement, but can only serve as an example to others. The elenchos cannot cure those who refuse to accept the treatment and to adapt their lives to the conclusions of the argument, but the spectacle of their su fering may nevertheless induce others reform themselves.
The role of the incurable o fenders in the Gorgias has been much debated, for the very idea of punishing an incurable seems to y in the face of the rehabilitative idea of punishment that appears in the Platonic dialogues from the Gorgias to the Laws. While there can be no doubt that Plato takes the idea of the eternal punishment of certain exceptional gures like Mackenzie and Saunders see the punishment of the incurables as a survival into Plato's penal theory of the retributive element of Greek penology, the idea that the divine surrogates in ict retribution on those who did not pay the penalty in life (Mackenzie [1981], 225-239 and Saunders [1991], 198, 206 , particularly his discussion of the idea of the surrogate, 52-61). While Mackenzie sees the retributive element as a aw throughout Plato's penology, Saunders argues that Plato eliminates this aspect from his later works. Contrast now, however, Brickhouse and Smith (1997 and 2002) , who argue that the passages that appear to advocate retributive punishments in fact make sense in terms of Socratic intellectualist theories of punishment helping the wrongdoer become virtuous.
Tantalus from a mythic tradition in which they have been used to represent retribution, Plato himself has a use for them that does not include the retributive element. The fate of the incurables in the afterlife illustrates, in this life, the life of the unphilosophic who are powerful enough to evade any kind of outside restraint (kolasis). Their inconsistent and irrational lifestyle actually in icts continuous su fering upon them, and their souls are so deformed from the way they have lived that they can only continue, in the afterlife, the kind of life they lived when alive. Although it does not cure them, this punishment has a deterrent e fect, serving as a warning to those who are considering choosing the life of Callicles instead of the life of Socrates. Even if Callicles refuses to change his life in consequence of his public humiliation in the refutation, the silent audience of the dialogue, the aspiring students of rhetoric who had come to hear Gorgias (and, of course, the readers of Plato's dialogue), may pro t from the spectacle of his su fering.
Cf. Tht. 177a: οὗ δὴ τίνουσι δίκην ζῶντες τὸν εἰκότα βίον ᾧ ὁµοιοῦνται. 'The penalty they pay is the life they lead, answering to the pattern they resemble'.
Their deterrent value is not, as some have supposed, only for souls who are about to be reborn into another mortal life, for the Gorgias makes no mention of the metempsychosis that plays such an important role in Plato's other eschatological myths. The incurables serve as a deterrent to anyone who pays heed to the myth that Socrates tells, for like all nekyias, it reveals the conditions of the underworld for ordinary mortals who have not, like Odysseus, Heracles, or Theseus, ventured into the unseen realm. See Guthrie (1975) , IV, 306, who points out that revelations of the afterlife need not imply metempsychosis, as Friedländer (1969 Friedländer ( [1954 ), i. 185 had argued. Friedländer was supported by Dodds, who commented, 'The passage only makes sense on the assumption that the dead will one day return to earth: it presupposes the doctrine of rebirth, which Plato evidently already held when he wrote the Gorgias but did not choose to expound in this context ' (Dodds [1959] , 381). Such an assumption comes from the misguided attempt to nd consistency between the myths of Plato, as though they all expressed Plato's own beliefs about the afterlife rather than being used by him to express particular ideas in the di ferent dialogues. As Long, in the best treatment of metempsychosis in the Greek tradition, remarks, 'there is no trace of metempsychosis in the Gorgias any more than in the Apology' (Long [1948] , 65). Annas argues that metempsychosis need not be implied for the punishment of the incurables to make sense: 'it is inappropriately literal-minded to press any further the question, what happens to these curables who are cured. There is no answer within the myth in the form and to the extent that Plato has developed it' (Annas [1982] , 124).
At the end of the dialogue, of course, Callicles shows every sign of disregarding the admissions he has made in elenchos, of remaining uncured and incurable because he refuses to take his medicine. Socrates, on the contrary, says that if he is defeated in the elenchos and agrees with Callicles, but is found living contrary to his admissions, then he should be considered a complete fool and worthy of nothing: καὶ ἐάν µε λάβῃς νῦν µέν σοι ὁµολογήσαντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ µὴ ταὐτὰ πράττοντα ἅπερ ὡµολόγησα, πάνυ µε ἡγοῦ βλᾶκα εἶναι καὶ µηκέτι ποτέ µε νουθετήσῃς ὕστερον, ὡς µηδενὸς ἄξιον ὄντα (488a6-b1).
. Plato uses the myth of the water-carriers, earlier in the dialogue, to illustrate the sort of perpetual su fering that Callicles in icts upon himself by refusing to change his way of life, to show how Callicles' choice of life, far from being a life of action without restraint, is actually a life of su fering, both on a personal and political level. Socrates signals the application of the myth of afterlife to life in this world by his quotation of the famous Euripides' tag: 'Who knows if being alive is really being dead, and being dead being alive?' (492e10-11) While, on the literal level, the story conveys the familiar traditional idea that those who are not initiated 'carry water to this leaky jar with another leaky thing, a sieve,' Socrates builds an interpretation into the tale (493b5-7). According to the clever man from whom he heard the tale, the uninitiate (amuetoi) are the unintelligent (anoetoi), and the jar (pithos) is the persuadable (pithanon) and impressionable (peistikon) soul, which is leaky like the sieve. 'In the foolish men that of the soul with appetites, the foolish, intemperate, and insatiable in it, was a leaking jar, because it couldn't be lled ' (493a6-b3) . Socrates goes on to develop this idea of the soul as a jar which the intemperate man spends his whole life trying to ll in vain, deriving pleasure from the process of lling but pain from the endless emptying. On this level, the image obviously applies to Callicles' ideal of su fering no restraints on one's appetite, but Plato also τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν µέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν, τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν, cf. Euripides' Phrixus, fr. 833. The tag is attributed either to the Phrixus or the Polyidos. Sextus Empiricus attributes the same idea to Heraclitus (Pyrrh. Hyp. 3.230, see Heraclitus, fr. 62, 88) . Cf. Dodds' treatment of the passage in the Gorgias, ad loc. Aristophanes repeatedly uses the line to great e fect in the Frogs (1082, 1477), nally turning it against Euripides when Dionysos abandons him in the underworld and brings up Aeschylus instead.
φοροῖεν εἰς τὸν τετρηµένον πίθον ὕδωρ ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρηµένῳ κοσκίνῳ. Irwin translates πιθανόν as 'persuadable' and πειστικὸν as 'impressionable,' but, as Dodds points out, both adjectives should have an active sense. If both are derived from πειθω, the meaning would be some sense of 'persuasive'. A similar phrase occurs just above, attributed to some 'wise man,' τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἐπιθυµίαι εἰσὶ τυγχάνει ὂν οἷον ἀναπείθε-σθαι καὶ µεταπίπτειν ἄνω κάτω. 'That of our soul with appetites is liable to be persuaded and to sway up and down'. ᾽Αναπείθεσθαι, however, is unequivocally passive in sense. Blank (1991), 26-27 points out that the confusion between the active and passive senses, persuadable and persuasive, re ects the confusion of Callicles about the role of the orator, whether he is the persuader of the masses or is constantly persuaded by the masses to di ferent things. One might speculate whether the words in question also carried the sense of πείσεσθαι derived from πάσχω, to su fer, playing on the pun between πίθος, πεῖθω, and πάθος. If the words carried the resonance of su fering, as well as persuadable and persuasive, the connection between Callicles' confusion and the fate he will su fer, both in life and in the myth, would be neatly drawn. But perhaps this word play would be too much, even for a κοµψὸς ἀνήρ.
παράγων τῷ ὀνόµατι διὰ τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πειστικὸν ὠνόµασε πίθον, τοὺς δὲ ἀνοήτους ἀµυήτους, τῶν δ' ἀνοήτων τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ αἱ ἐπιθυµίαι εἰσί, τὸ ἀκόλαστον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανόν, ὡς τετρηµένος εἴη πίθος, διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν ἀπεικάσας.
uses the image to describe the life of the orator trying to gratify the everchanging and unsatis able appetites of the persuadable masses, a task as vain and tormenting as the labors of the water-carriers.
The power to persuade the masses, Gorgias has claimed, 'is responsible for freedom for a man himself, and at the same time for rule over others in his own city ' (452d6-8) . Callicles urges Socrates to a life of public speaking because learning how to please the crowd will enable him to save his life, but Socrates objects that to be able to have power in a city requires one to accommodate oneself to the rulers. For Plato, who could not accept the idea of the 'wisdom of the masses,' the policy of an orator trying to express the will of the people is nothing more than pandering, kolakeia. Like the cook who strives to delight the palates of his diners regardless of the e fect on their health, the orator who stays popular by telling the people what they want to hear is merely gratifying irrational appetites, a task that is ultimately as fruitless as trying to ll a leaky pithos, for the masses will Socrates opens his attack on both the personal and political position of Callicles with his observation that Callicles is in love with two beloveds, Demos, son of Pyrilampes and the Athenian demos (481c f.). The choice of the homoerotic metaphor allows Socrates to point out the confusion of the active and passive, ruler and ruled in Callicles' ideal. Although the adult male erastes like Callicles is the active pursuer, and the younger eromenos or paidika like Demos is the more passive, pursued person in the ideology of this kind of Athenian aristocratic homoerotic relationship, the beloved was also able to exercise a fair amount of control over the lover, who would go to great lengths to win his beloved's favour. Socrates notes that however absurd the things their beloveds say may be, both he and Callicles are helpless to contradict them (481d-482b). Although they are, in theory, the active partners in the relationships, guiding the youths into manhood, they are both, in fact, helplessly subject to their beloveds, the ruled instead of the rulers. The familiar paradox of the homoerotic romance allows Plato to bring out the ambiguity of Callicles' relation to the masses he desires to dominate. αἴτιον ἅµα µὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἅµα δὲ τοῦ ἄ ων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει ἑκάστῳ.
486b-c, 521a-d, 510a-e. Callicles here expresses the ideology found in Demosthenes and other orators, that the orator re ects the ideas of the masses whom he is leading. Ober (1989), 167 summarizes this ideology: 'the worthy orator prefers the same things as the many, and therefore, when speaking in public, he simply vocalizes the desires of the majority of his listeners. Because the wisdom of the group is superior to that of the individual, the desires of the majority are right desires, and the orator who voices these desires is therefore advocating the right decision … The presumption that to agree with the masses was to be in the right easily led to the implication that one's opponent must be regarded as a traitor. The savage tenor of Athenian political invective must be seen in the light of this progression'. Demosthenes 18.20 is the most concise expression of this idea in the extant speeches: 'but it is not the speech of a rhetor, Aeschines, or the power of his voice which are his worth, but it lies rather in his preference for the same things as the many and in his hating and loving the same things as his homeland. Having such a disposition, everything a man says will be patriotic'.
. never be satis ed. What Callicles thinks is ruling, both gratifying one's own appetites and gratifying the masses as an orator, is in fact being ruled, being enslaved to the never-ceasing, ever-changing demands of an irrational, contradictory mass. Callicles' chosen mode of life, which he refuses to reject even after his encounter with Socrates, this life amounts, in short, to nothing more than the fate of the uninitiate in the underworld, the eternal vain carrying of water in a sieve in the attempt to ll a leaky jar.
T A M
The myth of the water-carriers, like the myth of judgement at the end, serves to amplify and clarify the arguments in the dialogue, not to present ideas ungraspable by reason or to supplement a de cient argument with threats of hell-re hereafter. In the Gorgias, as in other of his dialogues, Plato takes advantage of the nature of myth as a traditional tale by utilizing both the traditional and narrative aspects. His myth plays with a variety of ideas and motifs familiar from the mythic tradition, elements that would evoke for his audience many other tales. The resonance of these traditional elements permits Plato to convey complex ideas in compact form, without a large amount of tedious explanation, since he need merely mention the name, for example, of Aiakos to conjure up the associations of just behaviour, judging disputes between the gods, and a special function in the realm of the dead. Not only does the general familiarity of these elements lend credibility to Plato's often radical ideas, but Plato sometimes invokes a speci c myth from the tradition that carries special authoritative force. He situates his narrative of a shift from the judicial system of Kronos to that of Zeus with
When ill health results from the diet of attering oratory, the city will blame the orators who are currently dishing it up, not those who accustomed them to Sicilian banquets instead of healthy regimens. Cf. Socrates' warning to Callicles and prophecy (post eventum for Plato) about the catastrophe of Alcibiades (519ab). The connection between Sicilian banquets and the Sicilian disaster of 415 should not be overlooked.
Aiakos, as Pindar (Isthmian, 8.21) tells us, settled disputes among the gods, καί δαιµό-νεσσι δίκας ἐπείραινε. No tale of such judging survives, but Aiakos plays a privileged part in interactions between the gods and men in a number of other stories, and later tradition gives him the role of the doorkeeper of Hades. In many manuscripts of Aristophanes' Frogs, the doorkeeper is labelled Aiakos, but there is no evidence that Aristophanes' audience would have thought of him as such. Lucian (DMor. 6) and Apollodorus (3.12.6) make him the holder of the keys to Hades. Isokrates relates that he was made a special servant of Hades and Persephone as a reward for his virtue, just as Rhadamanthys becomes the servant of Kronos on the Isles of the Blest in Pindar. (Isokrates 9.14; Pindar, Olympian II, 83 and Pythian II, 73, Cratinus, Cheirones, 231 [i: 83 K] , Plato, L. 948b, Plut. Theseus, 16b.) a reference to Homer's tale of the division of the cosmos when Zeus took power from Kronos (523a3-5). He also calls upon Homer to con rm his assertion that only the most powerful will be punished eternally in the afterlife (525d6-e2). Even his assignment of the expert in justice, Minos, as judge in the afterlife, is backed up by a direct quotation from Homer (526c7-d2). The support of the most authoritative voice in the tradition, whose tellings are familiar to nearly all of Plato's intended audience, shows that Plato's ideas t within the framework of Greek culture, making them more acceptable and persuasive to his audience even as he engages in shifting their values and ideals.
Plato also makes use of the features of myth as narrative to augment the force of his ideas in the dialogue by employing the temporal sequence of the narrative to bring out the relations between ideas. As scholars of myth as far back as Plotinus have noted, one advantage of a mythic narrative is that it can illustrate through chronological sequence the logical relations of ideas. Plato depicts the relation between the Athenian lawcourt system and the philosophical judgement of Socrates in terms of the shift from the system of judgement in Kronos' time to the system in Zeus's time. By separating them in time and portraying the system he prefers as the reform of the other system, Plato builds his evaluation of the two systems into his presentation of them and shows how the advantages of the later system speci cally compensate for the problems of the former system. The contrast between the systems can be represented more clearly in narrative than in a discussion because of the temporal sequencing of the narrative.
Plato also uses this feature of narrative to illustrate more clearly several di ferent aspects of the Socratic elenchos. In the myth, the stripping of the soul so that it appears before the judge without any witnesses occurs before the judge examines the soul of the deceased and before the deceased suf- Allen (2000) , 267 suggests that Plato's reshaping of the traditional story serves as a philosophic medicine for the audience (within and outside the dialogue). 'Both the stories about punishment and the decisions about punishment "cure" injustice in the soul by making a statement about the proper way to think about desert and by teaching the wrongdoer the "right" system of value. The storyteller who e fects a resigni cation of a symbol that encapsulates principles of authority and desert has the power to e fect a cultural paradigm shift and to change "the present order of things". This is Hippocrates' de nition of what a pharmakon does (Top. And. 45), and stories are medicine in this way'. ∆εῖ δὲ τοὺς µύθους, εἴπερ τοῦτο ἔσονται, καὶ µερίζειν χρόνοις ἅ λέγουσι, καὶ διαιρεῖν ἀπ' ἀ ήλων πο ὰ τῶν ὄντων ὁµοῦ µὲν ὄντα, τάξει δὲ ἢ δυνάµεσι διεστῶτα (Ennead III, . 'Myths, if they are really going to be myths, must divide out in time the things they relate and separate from one another many realities which are together, but which stand apart in rank or powers' (text and translation from the Loeb edition).
. fers the corrective punishments. Each of these incidents, however, re ects an aspect of the elenchos. The lack of witnesses corresponds to the elenctic examination of a single person's ideas, without the recourse to the opinions of others or to long oratorical speeches. The examination of the naked soul by the judge corresponds to the analysis of the person's ideas and the pointing out of the inconsistencies. The su fering in the afterlife corresponds to the shame of the elenchos, the e fect of the defeat in this philosophic contest which provokes the one who has undergone the elenchos to change his life. Although Plato illustrates the process of elenchos in many of his dialogues by depicting the interlocutors engaged in elenchos, the myth in the Gorgias separates out these di ferent aspects of the elenchos from one another, giving the reader a better understanding of the di ferent e fects of the Socratic elenchos.
P ' E
The elenchos, then, does not merely point out the inconsistency in an interlocutor's argument, diagnosing his problem. Rather, as the parallels with the judgement and punishment in the myth suggest, the shameful defeat in the elenchos also serves as a bitter purgative medicine that can transform the life of the interlocutor, checking the inharmonious elements and correcting the deformities of his soul. The Socratic elenchos humiliates its victim by showing him to be a fool who does not know what he is talking about or how he should live, but the pain of this experience can serve a positive function if he abandons his former ideas and way of living. The elenchos has its limits, however. Just as correction of injustice in this life can only be e fective if the guilty one is not able to escape punishment, the curative treatment of the elenchos can only work if the victim takes his medicine and engages in dialogue. If like Callicles he sulks and refuses to admit that he has been defeated in the elenchos, then he will continue to in ict the su ferings of the unphilosophic life upon himself. The spectacle of his humiliation and su ferings, nevertheless, can serve to educate those who see it, just as the punishment of the incurables in the afterlife acts as a deterrent to others. Plato makes use of the narrative logic of the myth to clarify the presentation of the philosophic mode of self-examination, supplementing the discussion of the elenchos with the illustration in the myth. The vivid images of the myth are perhaps the most memorable parts of the whole dialogue. The picture of the naked soul of the Great King, covered with the festering sores of his unchecked injustices, who is facing the stern judgement of Rhadamanthys, encapsulates a number of ideas in a compact and memorable form. In this one image are crystallized the ideas of the self made witness against itself, the damage that injustice does to the wrongdoer, and the need for an expert in justice to replace the reliance on the 'wisdom of the masses'. In the Gorgias, Plato makes use of the mythic tradition to condense his philosophic ideas into evocative images-whip scars on the naked soul.
